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1 INTRODUCTION 
In Grobler v Naspers' (Grobler) the Cape High Coun held an employer 
vica.riously liable for sexual harassment perpetr dted by one of its employ~ 
ees. The employer (and [he perpetrawr) appealed and in its judgment 
reponed as Media 2-1 Ltd and Another v Grobler-' (Media24). the Supreme 
Coun of Appeal (SCA) confirmed the liability of the employer. albeit on 
different grounds, 
While the judgments in Gmbler, and in A'fedia24 particularly, provide 
many answers they also highlight many new questions. Does a victim of 
sexual harassment only qualify for legal protecrion once a condition as 
severe as POSt Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSS) manifests? If the PTSS is 
the resul[ of an incident arising OUl of and In [he course of the Victim's 
employment, would sections 35 and 65 of the Compensation for Occupa~ 
tional Injuries and Diseases Act (Cal DA)' apply? What reasonable steps 
should an employer take in the ordinary course La meet its common law 
duty to provide a safe working environment free from sexual harassment? 
Can [he employer still be vicariously liable even though it has met this 
common law dUly? What is the appropriate test to determine the em-
ployer's vicarious liabilJty for sexual harassment? Whac if any. is (he syn-
ergy between the common law and the Employment Equity Act (EEA)?~ 
To answer the abovementioned ques[ions. I shall first reflect on the 
sl1lient features of the jUdgments in Grobler and Media24. After thal, I shall 
endeavour [0 answer the questions with reference [0 existing jurispru~ 
dence and legisla[ion. 
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LAW, DEMOCRACY &,DEVELOPl\IIEr\n .. -I 
2 THE TRIAL COURT (GROBLER v NASPERS) 
Grobler was employed by Nasionale Tydskrifte Ltd (Tydskrifte). She al-
leged that over a period of approximately six months during 1999 she 
was sexually harassed bl Samuels who was employed by Naspers (which 
later became Media24), bu( who worked at Tydskrifte as a (rainee man-
ager. She worked for Samuels as a secre(ary. Grobler alleged that at least 
five incidems of sexual harassment were perpetra£ed by Samuels. The last 
and most (rauma(ic of these incidents ([he 'flat incident') occurred away 
from work while Grobler was showing her flat to Samuels, and also in-
volved a firearm.6 By the (ime the matter came before (he trial court, 
Tydskrifte had disposed of its undenaking and Grobler was its only re-
maining employee. Media24, however. accepted liability in respec( of any 
of Tydskrihe's obligations (Owards Grobler. Hence Media24's liability was 
alleged on two grounds: First, on the basis of i(s vicarious liability for 
Samuels' conduC(, and second, on Tydskrifte's failure (for which it assum-
ed liability) (0 provide a working environment free from sexual harass-
ment. GrobJer also claimed that, as a result of the harassment, she 
suffered from severe psychological trauma manifesting in PTSS. Unsur-
prisingly. Samuels and Media24 denied almost all of the above allegations 
and also raised two jurisdiClional defences. First, that by virtue of section 
35( I) of (he COIDA, Grobler was precluded from proceeding against 
Media24,7 and, second. that sexual harassment. by virtue of the Labour 
Relations Act (LRA)9 (read with i(em 2( I )(a) of Schedule 79 to the LRA and 
the Code of Good Prac(ice on the Handling of Sexual Harassmem Cases in 
the Workplace 1998).10 is a maner in respect of which the Labour Coun 
has exclusive jurisdiction. The jurisdictional defence relating (0 the COIDA 
was obviously raised on the assumption (hat sexual harassment is in one 
way or anO(her covered by that ACL 
The (rial court was satisfied (ha( the five alleged incidents of sexual 
harassment perpetrated by Samuels had in fact occurred" and that 
5 For purposes of this anicle Naspers is referred 1O as Media24 throughoul. 
6 The inciderHs that occurred at work included the fondling of her breasts (452C). stolen 
kisses (451 G and 452C). smacking her on the bottom (453A), making indecent COrTI-
ments of a sexual nature (451 B D) and calling her names such as 'Blondie' (451 C, 
452F-G and 453A) 
7 Section 35(1) of the COIDA prOVIdes [hat no anion shall lie by an employee or any 
dependam of an employee for the recovery of damages in respect of any occupational 
injury or disease resulting in the disablemem or death of such employee against such 
employee's employer, and no liability for compensation on the part of such employer 
shall arise save under the provisions of this Act in respect of such disablement or death. 
8 Act 66 of 1995 The EEA, which repealed the prOVisions of Item 2( I )(a) of Schedule 7 to 
the LHA, carne into operation on 9 August 1999 
9 ThiS item defined an unfair labour practice [0 include 'the unfair discrimination, either 
directly or indirectly, against an employee on any arbitrary ground, including, but nOt 
limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social origin. colour, sexual orienta(ion, age, dis-
ability. religion, conscience, belief. polilical opinion. culture, language. marital status or 
family responsibility'. 
10 Published in terms of the LHA, Note that this was the Code of Good Practice that applied 
at the time. A more recem code on sexual harassment, published dunng 2005, and 











































SEXUAL HAHASSMF.NT IN THF. WORI~PLA(E 
Grobler suffered severe emQ(JOnal stress as a result of these incidents. Nel 
J did not decide whether or not Crobler's condition could be classified as 
PTSS, II1S[Cdd hc con~idered whether Sdmuels' conduct was r espollsible 
for her condl(lon and concluded that it was. I ' On the ma([er of Media24's 
vicarious liability for Samuels' conduct. Nel J argued that nobody would 
actually be employed (0 perform their duties by means of sexual harass-
ment and that such deeds by an employee - even at the workplace -
would ordinarily be regarded as 'a frolic of his own', thus providing any 
employer with an almost perrect defence. '3 However, since such an inter-
pre(ation of vicarious liability does not take cognisance of the wide occur-
rence of sexual harassment in the workplace and Its far-reaching 
emo(ional and psychological consequences.'~ Nel J argued that the use or 
vicarious liability for sexual harassment against women in the workplace 
and children in the COnLexL of schools. clubs and churches ought to be 
extended. In justification of such development of the South African com-
mon law on vicarious liability, the judge relied on recent developments or 
the com mon laW in foreign Jurisdictions.'" alternatively the consti tutional 
duty to develop the common law r and held Media24 vicanously liable for 
Samuels' conduct. 
The two jurisdictional defences were both primarily dismissed on the 
basis that Grob\er was not employed by Media24.17 In the case of the 
defence based on the COIDA, it was also held that sexual harassment is 
nOl an 'accident' as contemplated by that ACl.'~ The trial court did not 
consider whether PTSS could possibly be a disease covered by the CO[rJA. 
In respect of the jurisdictional ddence, the court also held that the cause 
of action was an alleged delict that does not fall Within the exclusive 
JUflsdiction of the Labour Cour£. I I 
3 THE APPEAL (MEDIA 24 LTD AND ANOTHER v GROBLER) 
3.1 Factual findings 
I( is useful to first consider some of the critical factual findings that in-
formed (he salient features of [he ratio of the SeA's decision: Despite 
some inconsistencies in Grobler's evidence, the coun concluded [hat she 
was sexually harassed by Samuels. Farlam JA regarded the suggestion that 
the claim of harassment was fabricated by Grobler at the time of the 
disciplinary enqUiry as unlikely since the uncontested evidence was that 
she asked for Media24's sexual harassment policy after the first incident 
(the 'lift incident'). 'II The court specifically found that the final incident at 
her flat did not occur in the course and scope of her employment, but 
I~ 'lRXC .J: 
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LA;W, DEMOCRACY &DF;VELOPMBNT ,I 
while she was pursuing a private activity. ~l The court also accepted that 
none of ehe four incidents preceding the flat incident was sufficiently 
severe to result in a psychiatric injury qualifying for legal redress and that 
only the flat incident had the potential of resulting in damages qualifying 
for such redress. 22 The court also noted that Van As (a manager at Ty-
dskrifte) whom Grobler advised of the harassment by Samuels at an early 
stage (a week after the lift incident)23 and who claimed that he failed to 
deal with it as a result of her reluctance to pursue the matter, had no 
reason to disbelieve Grobler's assertions 'and should have realised (even if 
he actually did not) that her reluctance to take the matter further in no 
way cast doubt on the genuineness of her complaints,24 
3.2 Damages 
On the question of Grobler's damages, Media24 argued that Grobler failed 
to establish that she suffered from a recognised psychiatric injury. In this 
regard heavy reliance was placed on an earlier decision of the seA (Bar-
nard v Santam Bpk(' in which it ruled that damages can be recovered for 
emotional shock Csenuskok') only if it manifests in a recognised psy-
chiatric injury (although the court accepted in Barnard that such an injury 
need not always be the result of emotional shock). Media24 argued that 
since the trial court declined to find that she was in fact suffering from 
PTSS, Grobler failed to establish that she suffered from a recognised 
psychiatric injury.26 
Farlam JA thus proceeded to consider whether Grobler suffered from 
PTSS. The court accepted the diagnostic features of PTSS to be as set oue 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual oj Mental Disorders published by 
the American Psychiatric Association. It is useful co quote the paragraph 
relied on by the court: 
The essential feature of Postlraumatic Stress Disorder is the development of 
characteristic symptoms following exposure to an extreme traumatic stressor 
involving direct personal experience of an event that involves actual or threat-
ened death or serious injury. or other threat to one's physical integrity; or wit-
nessing an event that involves death, injury. or a threat to the physical integrity 
of another person; or learning about unexpected or violent death, serious harm, 
or threat of death or injury experienced by a family member or other close as-
sociate (Criterion A I). The person's response to the event must involve intense 
fear, helplessness. or horror (or in children, the response must involve disorgan-
ized or agitated behaviour) (Critenon A2). The characteristic symptoms resulting 
from the exposure to the extreme trauma include persistent re-experiencing of 
the traumatic event (Criterion B), persistent avoidance of stimuli associated wlch 
the trauma and numbing of general responsiveness (Criterion C)' and persistent 
symptoms of increased arousal (Criterion D). The full symptom picture must be 
present for more than 1 month (Cri(erion E), and (he disturbance must cause 
21 Par 77. 
22 Par 60 read with par 22. 
23 Grobler at 452A. 
24 Par 71. 
25 1999 (I) SA 202 (SeA) 208J. 










































SEXUAL IIARASSMENT IN fHE WOHKPI.ACE 
clinICally slgnlftcdnt distress or ImpalrmeQI In social, occupational, or ocher 
Important areas of functIOning (Cmerion r) _7 
The parries agreed lhal Cntena A2 and B [0 r were present, but It was 
disputed as to whether Criterion A I was presenr. Farlam JA concluded 
[hat the rlat incidem (involving a rirearm) was suftkiemly [rauma[ic [0 
have complied wi[h A I and held thac Grobler in fact suffered from PTSS 
and [hus a recognised psychiamc injury as contemplated in Barnard 8 
While this conclusion confirmed the liability or Samuels, Media24's liabil-
ity did nO[ necessarily follow, particularly since this incidem occurred 
dunng a prlva[e pursuit. 
Nonetheless the courl proceeded to confirm Media24's liabili[y. not on 
the basis of vicarious liabili[y for Samuels' conduc[. bu[ on the basis of 
Tydskrif[e's failure to provide a workmg environment free f"rom sexual 
harassment by other employees. 
3.3 Media24's liability 
On [he basis [ha[ it assumed [he responslblli[leS of [he now defunct Tyd-
sknf[e, and disregarding its possible vlcanous UabJllty for Samuels' con-
duct. Media24's liabililY depended on whether it could be said lhal Tyd-
sknfte was in any manner liable to Grobler. 
I[ is seuled law [ha[ an employer owes a common law du[y [0 its em-
ployees [0 take reasonable care for [heir safe[y and this duty, Farlam JA 
held, also extends to the protection of employees 'from psychologIcal harm 
caused, for example. by sexual harassment by co-employees' (emphasis 
added).~' On [he face of i[ and relying on a strict or statutory definition of 
an employee. [hiS should have been the end of the inquiry, since Samuels 
was not employed by Tydskri fte and was thus not a co-employee of 
Grobler It should. however, be noted that the judge was merely using an 
example to illus(ra[e [he extent of [he employer's duty, and thiS s[atemem 
should not be interpreted to suggest [hat employers arc excused from 
observing this duty in [he case of sexual harassmem by [hose who are no[ 
co-employees of the vic[im. 
Media24 argued [ha[ if i[ owed such a duty. i[ was founded in comrac[ 
and not delict and since Grobler's claim was premised on a delictual legal 
duty. it should fail.·s'l rarlam JA made shon shrlf[ of this argumem and 
emphasised that this is a common law duty not rounded in contract or 
statute. II This cont'irms [hat the general assumption by many that this is a 
contractual duty is wrong. All the South African cases on this issue have in 
fact proceeded on the basis of delictual liability which also broadens the 
nature of damages that can be claimed. \' 
27 Quoted dt prH 5(). 
2H Pdf~ ~)H :)9 
29 P<H (JS 
30 Par 26 
1 I ['ar 70. 
12 Wdlli<; M L(J/)()IIT 1111d employment !lJW 5 I~~ (19Y2) at 3 17 ([II ,1). AI'io sec Scot I A 'Sdfcty 










































The SCA then considered whether a negligent breach of this duty had 
been established. 33 SuRgesting
34 (with reference to an early judgment 
of the Industrial Coun and also the established law on liability for an 
omission)'6 that the legal convictions of the community are such that an 
employer is required [Q take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harass-
mem, the court held that an employer would be liable to compensate a 
victim for harm suffered should it negligently fail [Q provide such protec-
(ion. 
It is in this regard that Van As' failure to deal with Grobler's complaints. 
despite her reluctance to pursue the harassment, becomes relevant: 
If Van As had acted earlier in the way I have suggested r am satisfied that 
Wager'7 should (and on the probabilities would) at least have informed the sec-
ond appellant that his conduct Vis-a-VIS the respondent had not gone unnoticed 
and have warned him [hat, if such conduct persisted, nor only his ambition of 
nsing to a senior managerial position in (he company would come to nought 
but there was a very real danger of his being dismissed I think. it overwhelm-
ingly probable. k.nowmg what we do about the personality of the second appel-
lant and hiS relationship with Wager, that such a warning would in all prob-
ability have done the trick and prevented the flat incident from taking place. / 
have already found that, if the flat Incident had not taken place. the respondent 
would not have suffered the psychological injUry on which her claim is based (em-
phaSIS added1, ~8 
I( is also in this context that the doctrine of vicariOUS liability resurfaces. 
albeit not in [he terms suggested by the trial court. The SeA found that 
Van As' failure to address Grobler's claim was 'culpable' and held that 
Tydskrifte 'was clearly vicariously liable for his failure to act in this re-
gard,.)Q 
This approach. it is suggested. is rather strained: the employer is held 
liable in terms of its duty (Q provide a safe working environment for some-
thing that did not happen in the workplace at all on the assumption that 
the perpetra[Qr would have responded in a certain fashion had the em-
ployer reprimanded him for his conduct in the workplace.,1Q Perhaps this 
approach stems from a belief that Grobler ought [Q be compensated, com-
bined with (he court's view that only the flat incident. and not one of the 
incidents (ha( accually occurred in the workplace, resulted in injury worrhy 
of legal redress. I shall return to this issue below. 
3.4 Jurisdictional defences 
Farlam JA made some interesting oblter observations regarding the juris-
dictional defences raised by Media24. Media24 argued that because sexual 
33 Par 71 
34 Par 68. 
35 J v MUd (1989) 10 IlJ 755 (Ie) at 757G-758D 
36 Mmister Vlm PolisJe v t.·wels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) at 597 A . B 
37 wager was (he senior manager of Tydskrifte under whose direction Samuels worked. 
38 Par 72. 
39 Par 71 










































SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
harassment in the workplace has bcen regulated since j 998 by a Code or 
Good Practice~' published in terms of the LRA, and since it came Into 
operation during August 1999, also by [he EEA. sexual harassment is a 
matter In respeC[ of which the Labour Court has exclusive jurisdiction. The 
EEA was nO[ yet in operation when Samuels perpetrated the harassment. 
but at the time unfair discrimination In [he workplace (of which harass-
men( is a manlfesta[ion) was pan of the unfair labour practice definition 
in Schedule 7 to the LRA. This Schedule required such disputes to be adju-
dicated by the Labour Coun. Because section 157( I) of the LRA provides 
for the exclusive jurisdiC[ion or the Labour Coun in respect of matters 
which in terms of [he LRA or any other law are [0 be determined by the 
Labour Coun, Media24 argued that the High Court was deprived of juris-
diction to adjudicate this matter. Farlam JA rejected [his on cwo grounds: 
first, [he 1998 Code is clear that it does not limit [he rights of a victim to 
proceed with a civil claim for damages."' and second, relying on the dic-
tum of (he SeA in Fed(ije Assurance Ltd v WolJaardt.~' the employer's unlaw-
ful (onduC[. whether in a contractual or in a delic(ual sense, as opposed to 
its unfair conduct, is not the exclusive domain or the Labour CourL~" 
F,irlam JA Jlso dismissed Media24's argument that. as PTSS is a disease 
covered by (he provisions of section 65( I )(b) of the COIDA. the matter 
had to be referred to (he Compensation Commissioner. Section 65( I) 
reads as rollows: 
Subject [0 rt1e prOVISions ot thiS Chapter, an ernployee shall be enlllied lO the 
compensation provided for and prescnbed in this Act if it is provt:d to the satis-
faction of the Director-General -
(a) that the employee has contracled a disease mentioned In the first column 
of Schedule') and that such disease has arisen au[ of and in [he course of 
hiS or her employmem. or 
(b) (hat t he employee has canl raCted a disease other than a disease contem-
plaled In PJragraph (a) and lhat such disease has arisen our of and In the 
course of hiS 01 her ernploymenr 
Farlam JA declined to express an opinion on whether PTSS is a disease 
contemplated by section 65(l)(b). but held that the COIDA did not apply 
because [he incident that resultcd in [he PTSS occurred during a private 
pursuit. 4 ". 
4 COMMENT 
The SCA declined to make a finding regarding the trial court's conclusion 
on Media24's vicarious liabIlity for Samuels' conduct, but on the basis of 
stare deciSIS the High Court's Judgment remains binding in the Cape 
·11 lite Code ot G(Jud Pranic'(' 01\ Iht: ){,lJ\dllllg of St'XlJill llara~snWrH Cases, 1998. f"his 
("od~ Wcl.~ rt'plrl( (!d tJy rl code \\IlI/r lilt' ~dlT\<:' nJllle published In lerms of the EEA. See 
<..iuvernllwil I NOIICt" 1357 of 20US published on 5 August 2005 
-12 Par 75. Sec IIcm 7(61 of til(: 19S1H Code 
4"3 (;~OO I J d.d. ILJ 2407 (~( A) 
.1<1 Par 76 











































Provincial Division. Some aspec[s of [he SCA's judgment, however. cer-
tainly invite speculation and debate and provide, perhaps uninten[ionally. 
some pointers on the vexed question of vicarious liability for sexual harass-
ment by employees. These will now be considered with the help of the 
questions slated in the imroduction: 
I. Does a viclim of sexual harassment only qualify for legal prorection 
once a condition as severe as PTSS manifests? 
2. If the PTSS (or another recognized psychiatric injury) is the result of 
an incident arising out of and in the course of the victim's employ-
ment, would sections 35 and 65 of the COIDA apply? 
3. What reasonable steps should an employer take in the ordinary 
course to meet its common law dUlY co provide a safe working envi-
ronment free from sexual harassment? 
4. Can the employer still be vicariously liable even though it has met the 
above common law duty? Whar is the appropriare test to determine 
the employer's vicarious liability for sexual harassment? 
5. What, if any. is [he synergy be[ween the common law and the EEA? 
4.1 Does a victim of sexual harassment only qualify for legal 
protection once a condition as severe as PTSS manifests 
itselfl 
4. t. t The common law 
The SCA confirmed, with reference to Barnard. that when considering 
damages for emotional shock, the only ques[ion is whether [he victim is 
suffering from a recognized psychiatric injury. Barnard. in turn. relied on 
Bester v Commercial Union Versekeringsmaatskappy van SA Bpk41l in which it 
was held that emotional shock resulting in psychiatric injury qualifies for 
legal redress. provided that it would have been foreseeable by a reason-
able person in the position of [he perpe[ra[Or. 47 Both these cases dealt 
with so-called 'hearsay' cases; situations where the plaintiff suffered emo-
tional shock because of what happened [0 anmher (for example, observ-
ing a colliSion or receiving terrible news). However. in Media24 it was 
implied that the principle should be no different if the emotional shock 
(and the resultant psychiatric injury) is the result of a direct personal 
experience. 
Emotional shock as such, therefore, does not qualify for damages in our 
law; in any evem, not via rhe delicrual roure. 'Secondary injuries or ill-
nesses which manifest themselves subsequent to the inirial responses to 
exposure [0 trauma' are required. 48 Grief. sorrow, fear. horror. anger and 
anxiety would therefore not qualify for legal redress unless they translate 
into a psychiarric condition such as PTSS. Other examples of a recognized 
psychiatric injury include neurosis. psychosis. hysreria, insomnia and 
46 1973 (I) SA 769 (A). 
47 779H. 










































Sf.xLJAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACF. 
schizophrenia I" These conditions are severe and statistically manifest them~ 
selves rarely after a traumatic event -,C< Unless sexual harassment occurs in 
circulllstances as [raumaric as (hose (hat prevailed during the flat incident 
or unless sustained sexual harassment results in one of (he O(her recog~ 
nlzed psychiatric Injuries. the common law, it appears. does not allow [he 
victim to recover damages from the perpetralOr for emotional shock. In 
Media24 [his is evidenced by the court's very clear statement that the 
harassment that preceded the flat incident did nO( resul[ in any 'psychiat~ 
ric injury qualifying for legal redress' within the rules expoundedo l In 
Barnard. 
Statistics elsewhere suggest [hal. while women are not the exclusive 
victims of sexual harassment, VIctims of sexual harassmem in (he work-
place are primarily women," The Judgment in Media24 made it clear that 
(he common law would not have compensated Grobler for her emorional 
shock if (he flat incident had not occurred or if she had been a particularly 
strong woman able to cope emotionally with the trauma associated with 
(he flat incidenr, Does rhe fact that the common law requires such extreme 
and labelled consequences befort~ i( comes to the aid of rhose harassed nO( 
In effect continue to marginalise rhe position of women? Is this os(ensible 
insensitivity of the common law to [he pOSition of women in disrress a 
reflection of the common law's inherently masculine nature? 
The Constitution permits development of the common law in order to 
protect fundamental rights such as the right to equality, the right to dIg-
nity and the right to fair labour practices,'" The Constitution, however. 
does not allow indiscriminate development of the common law, but onlX 
if there is no legisldtion giving effect to the relevant funddmental rights ~ 
which many would argue exists In the form of the EEA and Promorion of 
Equality and PreventIon of Unfair DIscrimination AC( (PEPUDA),o:, The prob~ 
lern is that these stalUtes only protect the relevant rights in the contexr of 
unfair discrimination. whereas sexual harassment, as is evident from 
Grobler and Media2.J, may also constitute a delicr. Since the taller IS not 
regulated by legislation, there might well be circumstances, as was sug~ 
gested by the trial judge in Grohler,~'" when [he development of the com-
mon law of delict is necessary to give effecr to these realities, However, in 
ill) II)/Ii dr 10 31 AI~u see VI~se r I'J and I'll/ gi{'('r JM !.aw (Jf dmna!1cs 2 ed (2001) al 44S. 
:)0 MlllJiHlY d!ld IldIHifOl"<i (fn 48 "IJOw) ') 12 313 
5 \ PM ()O 
=i2 Tilt! I J ~ Equal Ell) ploy J1 )enl opportu nil 1(:'> ( o III III ir ICl! reporl s () n it s wel)Slre Ihal un Iy 
1 :"), I % ot sexual hiHdSSIIWJ\1 dldrgc~ fil<:ti willl Il during 20()4 wnc ITlcHie l)y men. 
({Hlp Ilwww ('('()c.gov/~td[slllclrcl'>s hUlll ill (esst'd LJll 17 Dectmber 200~) 
~)3 S H('3) of Ill<' ( IJIl '1 I lI11t iO/l of I til' HqJlIblir of Soulh Atncil, j Y96 (Consritu[lun), 
54 See 'AppllCJIH>rl' 111 Uleadle II, Davis [) cl[l(] Hciy~orll N SoUlh IVnl'lln ('onsllflJ{lOna//aw. 
The In/l of rlyhl.\ 2 ed Iss 1 (LOOS) cll 3- I () ') n ilnd ("urrit' I ilnd De Wdd] J The /)111 oj 
nyhls hand/J()ok ~ ed (200:)) ill 227 Als() set: flo/fmal) v Sowh l\fncan Airways 2001(1) 
SA I (en cit 14E C, NAJ)TOSA iJnd Ochers v /\.hl1i~lp.r of J:du(,(,uion. We.stern Capf' and Others 
CWO I) n 11./ HH9 (e) c1[ H%\)-,(" Al\.1!'U! () and Others v M/:,C, Arts, Culture. Sports and 
I~ecreat/()n Nor/Ilf'rn ProV/nf'l' rmd Ano/her (2001) 22 ILl 1975 (T) cit 1989Ci-1992t-l. 
S5 4 ot 2000 










































I, LAW, DEMOCRACY & DBVBLOPMENT, 
a legal system that does not embrace specific delicts,57 a development to 
allow damages for emmional shock resulting from sexual harassmem (but 
[hal cannot be labelled as a 'recognized psychiatric injury'), some would 
argue, ought [0 be resisted on [he basis that it would create an anomaly. 
While [he approach of the [rial coun is therefore preferred,58 it is sug-
gested that, in [he absence of such a developmem of the common law, 
claimants should endeavour to use existing common law remedies more 
crea[ively. 
In terms of the common law a victim also has the options of an inter-
dict and a claim based on iniuria 59 (which were nor pursued in Media24). 
The former will only be of assistance when there is a threat of sustained 
sexual harassment, and the latter, admittedly. has [raditionally yielded 
comparatively moderate amounts in damages.6o None[heless, the concern 
that the common law fails to recognize [he realities facing women, can 
perhaps be addressed by claimants making be[[er use of the actio iniuria-
rum and its obvious link with the Constitwional right to dignity and [he 
duty to develop [he common law. In this regard, much can be learned 
from the judgment in Bremner v Botha,O' albeit handed down 50 years ago. 
In that matter a shop manager, in the privacy of an office, called a shop 
assistant a 'bloody bitch'.62 In modern day terms this would certainly be 
regarded as a form of sexual harassment. In deciding whether the require-
ments for the actio iniuriarum had been met, the court considered whe-
ther the conduct of the defendant 'amounted to degrading, humiliating or 
ignominious treatment of the plaintiff which impaired her dignity'.M Mos[ 
forms of sexual harassment will meet this requirement. The court also 
made it clear that while intent is an essential element of this form of delict, 
the nature of the conduct complained of will often imply such intent. 
Following this route and spurred by the constitutional right to dignity, 
the position of the vulnerable employee, it is suggested, can effectively be 
addressed by awarding substantial damages relying on this action. 
4.1.2 The legislation 
Section 6(3) of the EEA provides that harassment is a form of unfair 
discrimination. Section 60&1 of the same Act renders an employer liable 
57 Neethling J. POlgieter JM and Visser PJ Law of delict 4 eli (200 I) at 4- 5. 
58 Tha[ is. [0 ask whether Samuels' conduct was responsible For Grobler's condition and 
not whether ~he was ~lIrrering from PTSS; see Crobler a[ 488C-E. 
59 Nee(hling et al (fn 57 above) 13-17 and 256-257. 
60 See Grobler at 517P. In Nee(hling J, PDlgieter JM and Visser PJ Neethlmg's Law of Per-
sonal1ty 2 ed (2005) at 199 i[ is claimed that substantial amounts are usually awarded 
for [he infringement of dignity. but the cases cited retlect modest. rather (han substan-
(ial damages. In Bremner v Botha 1956 (3) SA 257 (T) 262H damages in [he sum of £25 
were awarded and in Mal/wane v Cecil Nathan. Beattie &. Co 1972 (I) SA 222 (N) at 230H 
damages in the sum of RI50 were ordered. 
61 Pn 60 above 
62 259A. 
63 260H. 
64 Section 60 of the EEA prOVIdes as follows; 
58 
(1) If it is alleged thar an employee. while a( work, contravened a provision of thi~ Ac(, 
or engaged in any conduct (hat, ir engaged in by (ha( employee's employer, would 









































SEXUAL IIARASSMENT IN TilE WORKPLACE 
for sexual harassment of ~n employee by .a co-en;,ploye~ i~ it can be 
shown that an employer failed [Q take certatn steps .. If [his IS [he case, 
the Labour Court may. amongs( orher things, order [he employer LO pay 
compensation and damdges to the victim-employee. but because of [he 
structure of the EEA, no order can be rndde against the perpetrator-em-
ployee."j An award for damages in this context is not dependent on es(ab· 
lishing a recognised psychiatric Injury (as required by [he common law)' 
but rather on whether unfair discrimination (10 [his case sexual harass-
ment) occurred. This stems from [he faCl that the common law aims to re-
dress harm caused by a delict while [he EEA aims to redress unfair 
discrimination. r,! Psychiatric injury, in the case of an EEA claim would, i[ is 
suggested, be relevant. but only to determine the extent of the damages. 
For instance, in Chris/ian v Colliers Properties,r," a mauer concerning [he 
unfair dismissal of a sexually harassed employee and brought in terms of 
the LRA and the EEA, payment of damages in terms of section 50 of [he 
EEA was ordered despite the absence of evidence suggesting severe 
psychological trauma on the part of (he ViC(lm.r,u 
When ic is not possible for the viccim-employee to rely on the EEA (be-
cause the employer has raken the steps required by section 60 or because 
(he perpetrator was not employed by the employer). the only option 
would be to rely on the common law or to rely on section I I of the 
PEPUDA that prohibits harassment. Section 21 (2) of PEPUDA enables the 
equality couns to award damages. It IS suggested that these courts will and 
should, in awarding such damages, follow an approach similar [0 t~lat 
followed by the Labour Courts and not reqUire injury in the form of a 
recognised psychiatric injury before awarding damages. 
((JrhlillllC tl ('()Iilravenllurt ul' i1 pr()vb!!)!l of [hiS An, II\(" alll:gcd coniluCi Inllsr ill\-
11 \i;dl,1[I'ly be brought 10 Ihe ;'l(lel)[lon ot [he elnployt'r 
(2) TIl(" erllploycr musr consulr all relevant pdflies and nlrl~1 lake rhe necessary s(('ps 
HJ (:111111[\(I[C r h(' alleged comlll<"l and cUllIply willI ltl(' prOVisions of rIllS Act. 
(3) If ItlC clliployl:r f;.ulc; to lrlke II\(' Jlues<-;ary Slq)S reft'rrcd [() In "lloserlion ~. and II 
IS proved thai [lie employee hdS rontrnv(~ned IIle rckvdlH proVIsion, the employer 
rnust be eken ted a I~o ro IliNt' conlravened [1t;H j.J rov ISlll II. 
(4) Despllt~ slIl;<;(:C[IOII ()), (Ill l'mployer is not liable for [he conduct of an elllpJoyl.:C il 
lilar elllployer l~ able 10 prove lhal it did all lhal was reasonably rractlci1ble {O en-
sure lh(lt (lit' elllployee would 110[ au III COlltravenllOn of (his Acr 
/)~) nle~(! are, (lnlOl1g~1 ullter~, [hal [Ilt" employer corlsulted with (III relevanl pdrLW~ and 
look s[('ps [() ('liITlina[e tlie harrlSSlllCfIl and lOok steps to CI\SlIn' compliance WIth the 
EEI\ (lIter being llolified of [ite h,HaSSlllent, or [liE' employer did all [haL Wd~ rt:dSorldbly 
p()S~lbl(> [0 (>I\~ure llial I[S Llilployees would nUl harass For a dISCLlS~lOIl of rhe cm-
ploycr'~ lIability ill tt~rrll5 of.., ()O of the LEA see Le i{OlJX H. Orleyll T ilnd RymfL A Sex-
lwl h(zro!.,~l1wnt In the w()rkplwe. 1.I1W, POIICII:S and processes CW05) at 94 98. 
Ml Thc dlHy (U rerllOvt' ullfcllr dl~Cnll\lflaltOn in rile workplace IS a duty trllposed on rile 
t!rTlployer. Set.! s 6 uf Ihe EI:A. furtilrrrnore. s 50C!) of tfle EEA, dealing with [ile powers 
of tilt" Labour Court tn rhe Clist of an untair dlscrlminarion cldirn. provides for orders 
againsr the erllpluyer only. It wOlild llicrdore be tULlle for OriC ('rnployee (0 proceed 
dgalrt~t dliOlilcr Clllploycc in [(;rllls of the LEA 
67 SCI.: dISClI~Slorl III pM 4 ') ,l\lso '>ee Net'lhJJng et 111 (In 57 aLJove) 22 
(IB [200~J 5 I~LU~ 47<) (LCl 
6 t) Par 4W)E·F AI~o se, Nt~cll)() v ke(J/ SC'Cunty CC (2003) 24 II) 2141 (I.e) In [his lTIaller 
the ,'UUr! empliasized the dlStrcS~lllg rtallJfC of (lie hdrdS~1l1erll. but did not find thal Lhe 










































4.2 If the PTSS (or another recognised psychiatric injury) is the 
result of an incident arising out of and in the course of the 
victim's employment. would sections 35 and 65 of the 
eOIDA apply? 
Media24's defence was chac Grobler was by virtue of section 35( I) of che 
COIDA precluded from proceeding againsc ehe employer and che erial 
coun approached chis defence on che basis chat her condicion was an injury 
resulting from an accident. 70 Since the COIDA, so the trial coun argued. 
contemplaced a condition that results from a single incident, sustained 
sexual harassment does not qualify as an accident and hence the defence 
failed. 71 On appeal the focus shifted co whether Grobler suffered from an 
occupational disease as contemplaced by section 65 of the CO IDA. While 
Farlam JA conceded 'that employees who contract psychiatric disorders as 
a result of acts of sexual harassment co which chey are subjected in the 
course of the employment'7L might be entitled co compensation in cerms 
of section 65. he did not decide the pOint since in Grobler's case che inci· 
dent chat resulted in che PTSS was held to have occurred during a private 
pursuit and cherefore fell oueside the scope of che COIDA. What would che 
position have been jf che PTSS had been che resule of the inCidents that 
occurred ac work? 
Ie is suggesced that in che case of seccion 65( I )(b) of che COIDA the cru· 
cial question is nO[ so much the cype of disease chat is being suffered, but 
whether it can be said chat it had arisen out oj and in the course oj employ-
ment. In Nlsabo v Real Security een Pillay AJ seems to suggest thac che laner 
requirement was not mec on che basis that sexual harassment 'did not fall 
within ehe job description' or rhe duties of either the perpetrator or the 
victim: 
The compensation enVisaged in the EEA stems from a condition that is caused 
by a work related phenomenon. It is simply a scenario which is far too remore 
from the circumstances of chis claim. The condition of the applicant was clearly 
brought on by conduct which fell outside the boundaries oj the duties, directly 
and indirectly, of both Mr Olomo and the applicant. The conduct of which the 
applicant complained did not fall anywhere within the job descriptIOn of Mr 
Olomo nor that of the applicant. Consequently the condition of the applicant 
does not fall within the confines of the COl DA as it did not involve a condition 
listed in schedule 3 thereof and neither did it arise from or in the course and 
scope of her employment (nor indeed his) lemphasis added1.
74 
If this is indeed whac is suggested by the judge, 1 respectfully disagree. 
Elsewhere, in the context of vicarious liability. I have argued that ic is 
inappropriace to focus simply on an employee's designated tasks or ducies 
CO deeermine whether conduce falls wiehin [he course and scope of em-
ployment. It is suggested that the same argument applies co section 65 of 
70 Grobler al ~) 141-=-5160. 
71 SI6A· 0. 
72 Par 77 
73 2380C 










































L SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN TilE WOHKPLA(E --------------------------------~ 
[he COIDA
l
", To suggest thi:H conduct falls outside the scope of employ-
ment simply because it does not fall within a job description or an em-
ployee's dU(lcs is [0 refute the complex nature of Jllodern employmEm 
and would in any evem negate most claims based on either the COIDA or 
vicarious liability since many of these claims are premised on incidems 
(hat would nO( fall within any job descnpeion or duties of the employee. 7" 
Reverting [0 Media24, ie can also be asked on what basIs it can be 
claimed that Tydskrifte (via Van As) failed in its duty to provide a safe 
working environment to Grobler, if what she experienced did not some-
how arise from her employment 
Suppore for the notion that section 65( I )(b) of the COl DA ought to be 
interpreted to cover psychiatric conditions can also be found in the Occu-
pational Health and Occupational Health Services Conventions of the 
Imernational Labour Organisation (ILO).17 Both Conventions define health 
to include memal well-being. In addition, (he 2004 General Report of the 
ILO's Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Rec-
ommendations noted the trend in some European countries to regard 
stress, psychological harassment and sexual harassment as new occupa-
[ional risks.· h 
I have endeavoured to make the point that psychiatric injuries are cov-
ered by section 65( I )(b) of the COIDA, but must concede that the conclu-
sion is by no means obvious. Perhaps the rime has come for the legis-
lature to provide more clarity on [he interface between the COl DA and 
psychiatriC injurics_ Furthermore, considering the minimal redress that is 
usually recovered via the COIDA and (he limitation (ha( ir places on pro-
ceeding against the employer. (he question can be asked whether such an 
interpretation is in [he interests of the victim-employee. 
While, for the occasional victim-employee It WOUld, pOtentially, be more 
lucrative (0 proceed against a specific employer (as illus(rated by Grobler 
and Medla24 where the paymem of almost R800 000,00 to Grobler was 
ordered), i[ is doubtful whether many employers would be able LO survive 
the payment of such a sum. It IS mainly for this reason that the Constitu-
tional Coun has held that [he certainty of compensation, the elimination 
of expensive legal procedures and the need to show negligence. justifies 
the loss of the right to proceed against (he employer In delict as contem-
plated by section 35( I) of [he (OIDA ,~ 
75 Le Roux Cl ul (tIl 65 l1vuve) 9 I Also ~ee (he COrlllllencs of I kher AJA In Bt'Zwdenhour NO 
\I r.skoln (2001) 211LJ 1081 (S( A) al PlirS 19- 2 I 
76 SeUlon I of Ihe comA tidlllt::> 'accidenl' ([) Illean an acclderH arzslng OUi of and In the 
course of all enlp!oyee'::, eiliploymcm and re~ulrln~ in a perslHlal Injllry. tllneo.,s or lite 
eicdrh of (h(' ciliploycc Sucli accidt"lll<; would cerrdJIIly no! tJ(! In a job descrlplion and 
ye[ (lit' COIl)A (s 22) prOVides protection III such d ca~e. There is also norhlng ro suggesl 
[hal Ille phrast" an<"ng (Jut of and In the C(Jur..;e In s I should Iw irllerprcled dny differ-
en(ly in .., ()~) 
77 (urivelllioris 15Soll l)HI and 161 o119H5 
78 See par 22 of tlte Gener(J1 Repon (hllP Jlwww 1I0.orgltlolex/cngll"ll/_ccdcrn:psq hIm) 
79 Joostt'il Scort' Slq>t'rmurket Tr(1(iln!J (Ply) Ltd (MlrtlSIf'r of Ll/!mur rnlervenmg) ([ 999) 20 1LJ 
52:) (CC) Abu ~ee I{yuufl AI and PerUlildl D '( ornpenSi:lllrtg (IlL' harassed employee' 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY & DEVELOPMENt' 
4.3 What reasonable steps should an employer take in the 
ordinary course to meet its common law duty to provide a 
safe working environment free from sexual harassment1 
In Media24 the point was made by Farlam JA that the company (via van 
As) should have realized that Grobler's unwillingness to pursue the matter 
had nothing [0 do with the credibility of her claims and that preventative 
steps were required. 80 Thus, the reluctance of a harassed employee to take 
formal steps does not absolve [he employer from i[s duty [0 provide a safe 
working environment. 
This duty. i[ is suggested. is not only reactive but also proactive. In this 
regard [he employer will to a large extent discharge (his duty if it imple~ 
ments a workplace policy in the terms suggested by the Code of Good 
Practice on [he Handling of Sexual Harassment Cases in [he Workplace 
(2005 Code)81 promulgated in terms of rhe EEA.B2 The 2005 Code also 
emphasizes the need for employers to take formal action if there is a 
significant risk of harm to others in [he workplace, despi[e (he complain~ 
ant's wish not to follow a formal procedure. 53 It should. however, be noted 
that the 2005 Code supplements the EEA. which aims [0 eradicate unfair 
discrimination. The common law dUly [0 provide a safe working envi~ 
ronment Will often overlap with this aim. but it will not necessarily be [he 
case. For instance. if a complainan( is not willing (0 follow any of the pro~ 
cedures (not even the informal procedure) available in terms of the effec~ 
tively communicated policy consistent with (he 2005 Code. the employer 
migh[ well escape liability in [erms of [he EEA, bur, as evidenced by 
Media24 , not necessarily in terms of the common law. Furthermore. for 
employer liability to follow in terms of the EEA, section 60(1) of the EEA 
requires (ha( the workplace sexual harassment must immediately be 
brought to the attention of the employer. Liability in terms of the common 
law will. as postulated in Media24, depend on whe[her or not the em~ 
ployer has (aken 'reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment of its 
employees in the workplace' ,84 although, whether the harassment was 
brought (0 the a((enrion of the employer by the victim may be a factor (0 
consider. 
4.4 Can the employer still be vicariously liable even though it 
has met the above common law duty1 What is the 
appropriate test to determine the employer's vicarious 
liability for sexual harassment? 
In Media24 the SCA. unlike the trial court. avoided the doctrine of vicari· 
ous liability as the basis for Media24's liabili(y. None(heless. [he question 
80 Medw24 at par 71. 
8 [ Government No[ice 1357 of 2005 publIshed on 5 August 2005. 
82 See Le Roux et at (fn 65 above) 41-4B for a discllssion of the content and implementa-
tion of such a workplace policy. 
R3 hem B.7 2 of the 2005 Code 










































SEXUAL llARASSMENT IN TilE WORKPLACE 
can still be asked whether an employer can be held vicariously liable for 
sexual harassmem perpetrated by one of irs employees despite the fan 
lhiu the employer has discharged ilS dUly lo r->rovide a safe working 
environment. 
Much has been written about an employer's vicarious liablli[y for sexual 
harassment.'s Suffice it to say that the trial court in Crobler regarded [he 
rests hitherto applied by South African courts (that [he delic[ must have 
occurred during the course and scope of employment or, In the case of 
deviant conducr.°L that it must be suFriciently linked to the business of [he 
employer)~1 as inadequate because nobody is employed co harass.~:; Thus 
the development of [he common law was considered necessary and Nel J 
adopted the 'supervisor' and 'risk of enterprise' tests. used in foreign 
jurisdicrions, co hold the employer vicariously liable for [he sexual har-
assment by Samuels.~u 
[t is trite [hat vicarious liability IS not a legal rule, but is based upon con-
siderations of public poliCY, aimed at providing a person wrongfully injur-
ed with a "deep pocket" defendant and forcing employers to take respons-
ibility for the risk created by their opera[ions.~·J If these policy considera-
tions are s[ill valid (and there is nothing to suggest that they are not), the 
faeL Lhat an employer has done enough [0 discharge its duties (for exam-
ple, the duty [0 provide a safe working environment) does not negate its 
potential vicarious liability for the conduct of its employees. 
On the matter of the appropriate test for vicarious liability for sexual 
harassment in the workplace. it is suggested that the traditional test is 
sufficient to deal with sexual harassment~1 and that the imponallon of 
foreign tests Into Grobler was superfluous. 
This much was in any event suggested by the Constitutional Court in 
NK v Minister of Safety and SeCllrity~-' when it held that the test applied by 
the Appella[e Division in Minister of Police v Rabie~~ was still good law to 
W) Sl:e rhe cHlicit's li.,>rl~d irl III 2 ,\-le(/)(1 24 at par 17 
R(, '1 lidl is, conduct COll\Il\ILted dlJrlflg rI deviartCJfI frofT[ Ille Bormal pcrtorlTlcHIc(' or til(! 
cmployee'>. dlltles: see NK v J'l-11n1sfl'r oj Safery and .'·iecurlly (2005) 26 fLJ 1205 (CC) 
pdr 2:1 
87 In urd{'r 10 eSLabII~1r VIC ii[lOUS IlabJl,LY un tlie pdn 01 tll(' enlpluyer (he plalmin must 
prove tll(j[ (I) th(~ pt'rpctraror wa~ an elilployec of rhe employer; (2) the perpetreltor 
{omrnl[[ed a dellu dgdinsr Ihe plainrift while (3) <letlng wirl1in [he course and scope ot 
iriS ellll-lloyrilenl, ~ee Isaac!> v ("el1{re Gilards C( [Ia Town Cenfre Security (2001) 25 f~J 
667 l C) a \ 66<)(, II rile requirelllelli t!lal. in I lie ca~e ot deviant u.mdun. it must be sul-
ftClelHly linked Willi Ille uLJs/fle>.>. of tire employer IS. I( i!> !>uggested, not a dlflerent re-
quirellH'nr. bUL Simply <Hi did to (','>t<lIlJ,sli whether conduct occurred Within the cuurse 
and !>COpt: uf elllpluylllerH iii uncertall1 ca~es 
8!-l (Jrohler dt ·19SB C 
~N (;ruulcr dt 5 J 4A B TIlt" coun dlsu relied on rile dilly (0 develop the com[llon law III tile 
allerllCllive, ~e(· dl :'1141-1 
90 Feldman (pry) Uil v Mull I <)4S AI) Tn el( 74 J: Afhlonyu (lnd An(J/her NO v Mill/ster (4 
Polree J 978 (2) ~A 551 (A) ar 56711. lUi Johnson Crane 11m' v Cro([o Steel ConslrIlc/UJ/l 
1992 (1) SA 90710 rli 9()HF. Minister of Law (wd Order v Ngobo 1992 (4) SA 822 (A) ar 
RJJH. (Jl"Ovler a[ -19t\F H 
<1 J See lJ:! I\()ux e[ (II (f'l (,S al)Uve) 91 93, 
92 (200:") H, Ilj 120:") (CC) 










































LAW. DEMOCRACY &: DEVELOPMENT 
determine whether the Minister of Safety and Security ought to be vicari~ 
ously liable for the rape of a young woman in distress by three on-duty 
policemen. 94 The Constitu(ional Court formula(ed the Rabie test (that 
applies to deviant conduct) in (he following terms: 
The approach makes it clear that there are two questions [0 be asked. The first 
is whether the wrongful acts were done solely for the purposes of the em-
ployee. This question requires a subjective consideration of the employee's 
state of mind and is a purely factual question Even if it is answered in the af-
firmative, however, the employer may nevertheless be liable vlcartously if the 
second question. an objective one, is answered affirmatively. That question is 
whether, even though the acts done have been done solely for the purpose of 
the employee, there is nevertheless a suffiCiently close link between the em-
ployee's acts for his own interests and the purposes and the business of the 
employer. This question does not raise purely factual questions, but mixed 
questions of fact and law. The questions of law it raises relate to what is "suffi-
ciently close" to give rise to vicarious lIability.95 
Based on thiS, and with reference to the facts in Media24. it can be asked 
whether the harassment by Samuels was not sufficiently linked to the 
business of Medla24 to establish vicarious liability. Although the SCA 
avoided the doctrine of vicarious liability, the route it followed suggests 
that such a link existed. On what basis, for instance, could Van As (or his 
manager) have been expected to speak to Samuels (and also dismiss him) 
about the harassment (as suggested in Media24)96 if they did nO( have 
authority over him regarding this conduct? And if they had such authority, 
does it not suggest that his conduct was sufficiently linked to the em-
ployer's business for (hem (0 be concerned about it and to exercise their 
authority? In this regard the following remark by Farlam JA (quoted ear~ 
Iier) is significant 
If Van As had acted earlier In the way I have suggested I am satisfied that 
wager should (and on the probabilities WOUld) at least have informed the sec-
ond appellant that his conduct vis-iI-vis the respondent had not gone unnoticed 
and have warned him that, if such conduct persisted, not only his ambition of 
rising to a senior managerial position in the company would come to nought 
but there was a very real danger of his being dismissed. I think it overwhelm-
ingly probable, knowing what we do about the personality of the second appel-
lant and his relationship with Wager, that such a warning would in all prob-
ability have done the trick and prevented the flat inCident from taking place. 97 
The above was said on the assumption that Samuels' conduct constituted 
deviant conduct and while i( probably did. it might not always be clear. 
Some of (he comments in respect of the question discussed in para-
graph 4.2 in the context of the COIDA are also relevant here.Cis Vicarious 
94 Al par 45 O'Regan J remarked thaL: 'The common-law tes( for vicarious liabili[y in 
deviation cases as developed in Rabie's case (supra) and further developed earlier In thiS 
judgmenl needs [0 be applied to new sets of facts in each case in the ligh[ of [he spirit, 
purport and objects of our ConstiIU[ion. As cOUrts delermine whelher employers are 
liable in each set of factual circumstances, the rule will be developed.' 
95 Par 32. 
96 Par 72. 
97 Medw14 a[ par 72 










































SEXUAL HAH.ASSMENT IN THE WOfU<PLACF. 
liability for sexual harassment can, it is suggested, also be resolved by 
applying the standard test for vicarious liability (did it occur wlLhin the 
cour~e anu scope of employment?) if relarionships inCidenral [0 employ-
ment and not only the designated tasks of the employee are regarded as 
falling withm the course and scope of employment. Hence, conducting 
these relaUonships Improperly (by harassing) may result in the employer's 
Vicarious liability. 
A finding or VIcarious liabiliLy would rherefore have been justified, at 
least in respecr of the incidenrs that occurred in the workplace. The SCA 
probably followed the 'strained' route it did because [he harassment that 
cau~,ed the injury dId nO( occur during the course and scope of employ-
ment, neither was it suffiCiently linked to the business of the employee, 
and the harassmenr that did meet these tests did nO(, In the view of the 
coun, result In injury that could be redressed by the common law. 
Bw for the fac( that the incidents at work did nO( result in damages, 
(here is enough in Media24 to suggest that a basis does exist for the 
employer's vicarious liability for sexual harassment by its employees. 
However, if it is correct that a disease such as PTSS is covered by secrion 
65( I )(b) of the COIDA. the employer's vicaflOUS liability for sexual harass-
mCrll perpetrated by one of its employees will arise only if the victim is 
nor employed by rhar employer. In instances where the perpetrawr and 
the vIctim are employed by the same employee, the COIDA will apply ~~ 
4.5 What, if any, is the synergy between the common law and 
the Employment Equity Act? 
Assuming that an employer can be liable in terms of section 60 or the EEA 
for sexual harassmenr perpetrared by one of irs employees on anorher, 
and assuming that the employer can also be liable in terms of the com-
mon law for Lhe same sexual harassment, either because it failed to pro-
vide a working environment free from sexual harastiment or because it is, 
one way or another, vicariously liable. may the victim proceed with both 
ttle statutory and common law claims? 
The EEA gives effect [0 a number of fundamental righ[s aImed at ensur-
tng equaliLy and fairness In the workplace. The aIm of Lhe common law is 
LO redress harm caused by a dellu and, unlike the (OIDA, there is nOlhing 
In rhe EEA [Q suggest that a claim pursued In terms of the EEA deprives 
the employee from taking common law acrion against the same employer. 
However, should an employee be able to proceed with both claims, by 
virtue of the Labour Court's exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the EEA 
and its lack of jurisdiction in respect of the delictual claim, the employee 
would have to proceed in both the High Court and the Labour Coun. 
Furthermore, the defences of res Judicata and lis pendens would also not 
be available to the employer SJrlce the [WO claims are founded on different 
causes of action. nc-
l)l) I h,H l~. assullllllg Ihd( II did arl~c OUl of (ill' cuurse ot clllployrTlCIH 










































LAW. OEMOCfV,Ct &. DEVELOPMENT" 
Can the employee proceed and succeed with both claims? It is sug~ 
gested that some guidance can be extracted from the judgment of the 
Labour Court in Parry v Astral Operations Ltd. 101 I n this matter a retrenched 
employee claimed damages for the unlawful termination of his employ-
ment (contractual damages) as well as compensation for unfair dismissal 
in terms of section t 94 of the LRA. In this matter, by virtue of sec~ 
tion 77(3) of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act
l02 
conferring juris~ 
diction upon the Labour Court to determine contractual disputes, it had 
jurisdiction to adjudicate both the contractual and unfair dismissal dis-
putes. I03 The Labour Court, relying on the judgment of the SCA in Fedlife v 
Woifaardt,lr.H held that the LRA does not prevent an employee from enforc-
ing contractual rights and ordered damages for breach of contract as well 
as compensation for unfair dismissal. The court, however. emphasized 
that the damages awarded for the breach of contract should be factored 
into the assessment of the compensation for the unfair dismissal.
l
® 
While Parry concerned unlawful conduct in the context of contract and 
a statutory claim for unfair dismissal, by analogy the same principle should 
apply to unlawful conduct in the context of delict and a statutory claim for 
unfair discrimination. While complicated by the need to litigate in differ~ 
ent courts, the employee should. in principle. be able to proceed with 
both claims, subject to amounts awarded in one matter being considered 
in the other,lOb and further subject to the victim~employee's common law 
claim possibly being usurped by [he terms of the COIDA. In instances 
where the victim is not [he co~employee of the perpetrator, a similar 
synergy will exist between [he PEPUDA and the common law. 
5 CONCLUSION 
In [he past two years, as a result of the combined impact of Jurisprudence 
and legislation, sexual harassment in the workplace has acquired a new 
significance for employers. This reality, however, does not imply that em~ 
ployers can be cenain of the legal implications if sexual harassment 
occurs in the workplace. There are still many areas of uncertainty in 
which. unless resolved by judicial pronouncement or legislative interven-
tion, there are simply no clear answers. These include the role of the 
COIDA. the synergy between the common law and the EEA, the exact 
extent of the employer's duty to provide a safe working environment, and 
the parameters of vicarious liability in this context. It is more certain, first, 
that employer liability for sexual harassment in the workplace. either in 
terms of the common law or legislation is not simply negated by the fact 
10 [ (2005) 26 ILJ 1479 (LC). 
102 75 or 1997 
103 Pars 93 98 and par 141 
104 (200 I) 22 llJ 2407 (SeA) 
105 Par 100 
106 Also see (he remarks or Farlam JA In Media 24 a[ par 76 concerning the exclUSive 











































SF.XlJAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE 
that nobody IS employed to harass and, second, tha[ (he common law as 
it presently stands will not compensate a victim of sexual harassment 
suffering from emo(lonal shock unless it has developed Into a known psy-
chiatric injury. IL is in this regard that, iL is suggested, a development of 
the common law is called for. Falling such development, [here is a danger 
that vulnerable employees, particularly women, will continue [0 be mar-
ginalized However, even failing such development, all is not necessarily 
lost. For instance, exploring the possible use of forgoLtcn common law 
remedies and [he synergy between the common law and legislation may 
present unexpected answers 
Sexual harassmenL in the workplace and elsewhere IS a sad reality of 
our time. Ry pos[Ula[ing the dbove quesLions and exploring possible 
answers, I have endeavoured to illustrate that sexual harassment is an 
exuemely complex legal phenomenon and chac [he ques[ions raised by it, 
more often than not, do not orfcr obvious answcrs. Thcre is a 10( about 
sexual harassment that we simply do not know. 
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